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China Came, China Built, China Left?: 
The Sarawakian Experience with Chinese 
Dam Building 
Shun Deng FAM 
Abstract: This paper uses a political ecology approach to unpack the 
experience of local governments and displaced communities in Sara-
wak, Malaysia, with Chinese dam construction at the Bakun Hydro-
electric Dam. Data for the study was collected over 32 months from 
2014 to 2016. The field site offered a unique insight into how recipi-
ent countries of aid are also often at the receiving end of domestic 
politics of donor countries. The paper finds that Chinese and Austral-
ian enterprises involved in the dam construction and resettlement of 
indigenous communities displayed different understandings with 
regards to social and environmental safeguards, resulting in a dys-
functional handover of the project from Australian to Chinese leader-
ship. Consequently, indigenous communities were dispossessed from 
their land, affecting their ability to successfully reconstruct their live-
lihoods, with their attempts to do so causing further damage to the 
environment around the reservoir of the dam.  
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Introduction 
Urban and Nordensvard (2014) wrote that three conditions have 
caused China to start exporting technology such as hydropower on 
massive scales: access to resources, access to new markets, and tech-
nological advances. First, China has a need to continue to fuel eco-
nomic growth by expanding its resource base, which is quickly being 
depleted after years of rapid economic growth. The Chinese govern-
ment facilitates such access via the “Going Out” strategy and state-
assisted financing, which encourages Chinese companies to invest in 
overseas energy and resource sectors. Second, sectors such as hydro-
power have become saturated within the low-margin Chinese domes-
tic market and, as such, the first generation of large state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) operating under liberalised markets needed to move 
towards international markets. Third, Chinese engineering standards 
have also improved rapidly within sectors such as energy generation, 
and this has provided them with the technology and skills to meet 
demand in a lucrative global energy market (Bosshard 2007). Increas-
ing public awareness of the dangers of carbon emissions, climate 
change, and renewable energy also helps create the conditions for 
exporting hydropower technology. All these factors have combined 
to result in exports of Chinese power-generation equipment becom-
ing one of the best performers in the Chinese export economy. In 
2000, such exports totalled USD 26.8 billion and by 2010 power-
generation equipment had become China’s second-largest export, 
accounting for USD 309.8 billion (Dinh et al. 2013: 52). 
As of November 2014 (International Rivers 2014), 308 dams en-
tailing Chinese involvement had been completed, were under con-
struction, or were proposed worldwide, 123 of which are in Southeast 
Asia (comprising 40 per cent of Chinese dams worldwide). Of the 
Southeast Asian dams, one in Brunei is for maintaining water supplies, 
one in Vietnam is for irrigation, while many others are for hydro-
power. The explosion in the Chinese dam-building endeavour is start-
ling when one realises that, prior to the turn of the millennium, there 
had been only six Chinese-constructed dams outside of China.  
China’s corporations (led by state-owned giants such as Sino-
hydro), under the “Going Out” strategy, are able to offer a much 
more parsimonious path to infrastructural development for politically 
and economically isolated governments and, at least superficially, also 
provide geopolitical and legal cover for their projects by rigidly stick-
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ing to Westphalian principles of non-interference in domestic affairs 
(Panda 2014). This way of implementing aid and development assis-
tance undoubtedly puts China in a powerful position relative to recipi-
ent governments, as there is no other source of aid who would not 
rock the existing political boat in recipient countries. China’s position 
of power means that in their projects, they could easily choose to 
approach their corporate social responsibilities by fully embracing 
them, enforcing a particular rejection, or anything in between. These 
factors certainly played out in Sarawak, Malaysia. This paper essential-
ly looks at two main areas of concern of Chinese involvement in 
hydropower projects in Sarawak and Southeast Asia as a whole. First, 
Bakun is the clearest example of how Western green politics, despite 
their efforts, will likely not be able to significantly diminish demand 
for hydropower in developing Southeast Asia, and that Chinese hydro-
power corporations are well-placed to meet this demand instead. 
Second, in the absence of Western green and corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR), the onus in those areas partly falls on the Chinese cor-
porations taking over these projects; at Bakun, Chinese companies 
clearly failed to fulfil these obligations, especially in the absence of 
the requisite prodding by the recipient governments of Sarawak and 
Malaysia. This has resulted in adverse impacts on biodiversity, natural 
fisheries, and freshwater supplies, as observed elsewhere (Urban et al. 
2013). Combined, these in turn contribute to the entrenching and 
widening of socio-economic inequalities among the displaced com-
munities and between displaced communities and other surrounding 
communities (Sawyer and Gomez 2012; Cademartori 2002). Research 
published earlier from the same field site, and overlapped with the 
fieldwork period of this paper, has looked at social protections 
around the resettlement and noted that the Chinese involvement in 
this project did not include assistance with resettlement or social 
initiatives (Cooke et al. 2017). However, that work did not consider 
that Chinese enterprises began to lead the Bakun project at a consid-
erably late stage, after Australian interests withdrew. 
Instead of looking at Chinese involvement in Sarawak as a siloed 
concept, this paper attempts to take a more integrative political eco-
logical approach, by also considering how it came to be that the Chi-
nese ended up being the only viable alternative to completing the 
construction of Bakun. In choosing a political ecological approach, 
this paper necessarily admits that the environment must be a politi-
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cised one to begin with. It then also follows that there are groups of 
actors involved, each with their own interests and agencies, and that 
the power differentials, established by the history of the hydroelectric 
dam and the lake, explains the environmental and socio-economic 
symptoms observed post-inundation and post-displacement (Bryant 
1997, 1992; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). Ultimately, the paper argues 
that the Bakun experience shows that host countries can end up be-
ing sandwiched by the differing responsibilities and domestic politics 
of competing aid donors, to the detriment of displaced communities 
and the natural environment. The Bakun project is also the only one 
that the author knows of in which Chinese SOEs took over the lead 
of a project midway through. 
The second section of the paper covers the use of political ecol-
ogy as a framework, and provides information regarding fieldwork. 
This is followed by an examination of the historical context of the 
international dimension of the Bakun project, with the narrative 
showing how Chinese SOEs took the lead in a project that started 
out as an Australian one. The fourth section looks at the experiences 
of the displaced communities through the leadership changes in the 
project, and how these in turn impact their livelihoods and their in-
teractions with the environment. The final discussion section delves 
further into the Malaysians’ specific motivations behind the project, 
and the perspectives from which the Chinese approach the project. 
The concluding section repackages the whole Bakun project into 
scales, which more clearly present the conflicts and results of the 
different approaches of the different actors, and also briefly discusses 
policy implications with regards to shifting leadership roles in hydro-
power projects. 
Political Ecology Methodology 
The political ecology approach can instead be seen as a framework in 
order to understand how political and environmental factors interact 
with each other to cause actors on various scales to effect social and 
environmental changes. Briefly, the political ecology approach can 
consist of three components (Kalipeni and Oppongb 1998), which 
are by no means equally weighted, nor indeed compulsory at all, such 
is the methodological fluidity of this field. These components are: 
context and scale, historical depth, and structural relationship. 
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“Context and scale” looks at interactions between actors and 
their environment through the various scales (Blaikie and Brookfield 
1987). The researcher looks at how their relative power and associat-
ed political and economic differences affect the management of and 
access to resources and the implementation of policies that favour 
certain groups over others (Mayer 1996; Stonich 1993). “Historical 
depth” examines the interactions between actors and their environ-
ment by considering local histories and ecology. This diachronic 
component often reveals the rationales behind various persistent 
practices that may intuitively seem detrimental to the environment 
(Kalipeni and Oppongb 1998; Atkinson 1991; Peluso 1993). “Struc-
tural relationships” refers to the interactions between actors in an 
environment and the way institutions (even seemingly unrelated ones) 
channel these actors through a fixed, not always rational process 
(Kalipeni and Oppongb 1998). 
The “political ecology approach” employed by various research-
ers uses power as a focal point, as most of the work is centred on 
political questions with little ecological input. A study of political 
ecology in and around the Bakun hydroelectric scheme and the Ba-
kun resettlement scheme needs to focus on not just the politics of 
access to resources and their management, but also on the existing 
environment that has led to various decisions in environmental and 
subsistence management. Indeed, when first coining the very term 
“political ecology” in his critique of ecological anthropology and 
cultural ecology, Eric Wolf emphasised the need to weave local eco-
logical contexts with insights into political economy (Wolf 1972). 
Here, environmental impacts are related to how Malaysia and China 
each viewed the project differently, from their own political perspec-
tive, and the steps they each took (or did not take) to protect the 
environment and the displaced communities. 
The advantage of a political ecology approach is that it provides 
an avenue to conceptually integrate several areas of research. Much 
research has been done on the anthropological and sociological (Ai-
ken and Leigh 2015; Alexander 2014; Tilt, Braun, and He 2009; Choy 
2004; Fearnside 1999) and ecological impacts (Benchimol and Peres 
2015; Fearnside 2014, 2001; Harnish et al. 2014; Palmeirim, Peres, 
and Rosas 2014). Some authors, such as Philip Fearnside, publish 
research from the same field site, from both sides of the “divide,” but 
have not written integrative work in the political ecology tradition 
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(see Fearnside 1999, 2001, 2006, 2014). In general, these studies 
demonstrate the often adverse social and environmental impacts of 
hydropower. In recent times, an increasing amount of work has been 
done to link the two sides, giving a clearer overview of how observa-
tions made at local-scale society and ecology are driven by the greater 
political economy. In particular, the political ecology approach is used 
frequently in research concerning hydropower, because these infra-
structure projects often involve the overlapping of politics, sociology, 
economics, and the environment (Matthews and Geheb 2015). 
The foundations of this paper are first laid by the introduction of 
the rationale behind the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy 
(SCORE). We then look at how green politics turned the Bakun hydro-
power project from an Australian-initiated endeavour into a Chinese-
led one, including how the process played out in the experiences of 
the displaced indigenous communities. Finally, the paper discusses 
how the prevailing political situation in Sarawak and the state of CSR 
development in China at the time created the conditions that made it 
possible for Sinohydro to avoid taking a role in mitigating the envir-
onmental and socio-economic effects of the Bakun Dam. Five groups 
of actors are involved: Chinese companies involved in hydropower 
construction led by Sinohydro; Western (mainly Australian) corporate 
interests represented by Australian hydropower companies and Rio 
Tinto Alcan, which was meant to buy the electricity from Bakun; the 
Australian green movement and Green political party; Malaysian in-
terests mainly represented by the Sarawak state and Malaysian federal 
governments; and the displaced indigenous communities.  
Historical information about the dam has been well-covered in 
the literature. Field methods included ecological and social science 
techniques. As mentioned previously, political ecology suffers from a 
lack of “ecology,” and the work for this paper is part of a larger pro-
ject that attempts to tackle this issue. Ecological information here is 
important in deciphering the effects of post-displacement livelihood 
choices. Techniques include camera trapping and transect surveys of 
the catchment area for game animal abundances and behavioural 
changes, and Poisson modelling analyses for camera trap data (in 
prep). Social science methods include participant observation, and 
informal interviews. Fieldwork was spread over two and a half years, 
during which time I lived with one of the displaced families in a 
Kayan longhouse. I spoke to and collected information relevant to 
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the project from over 100 families spread throughout the 15 long-
houses, representing five ethnic groups, from the aristocratic classes 
to the commoners, as well as the elected representatives. Structured 
methods were not used, as there was some resentment from some 
residents about being constantly surveyed by transient academics 
when I first arrived. “Last time, also there were researchers from 
government and universities here to survey and interview, but in the 
end, everything is still the same,” is a common complaint. Therefore, 
to capture as much information as possible, including from people 
who would otherwise skip focus group discussions, a decision was 
made to extend the period of fieldwork to embed myself into the 
community and gain the trust of more members of the community 
and the political representatives. E-mail interviews were also con-
ducted with the community engagement consultant for Rio Tinto 
Alcan. Overall, the research period stretched from January 2014 to 
August 2016. 
Setting Up a Chinese Stage 
The Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) 
Hydroelectric schemes, especially conventional hydroelectric 
schemes, also bring about several potential problems to governments 
intending to build them. Rivers have always been important to civili-
sation and human settlements. This is especially true in the interior of 
Sarawak, where the extremely mountainous terrain has formed practi-
cally insurmountable natural mobility barriers to even modern modes 
of land transport (Windle and Cramb 1997). Indigenous Dayak long-
house tribes are thus strung out along the massively complex system 
of rivers and depend on the rivers for transport and confluences with 
tributaries for freshwater supply and fishing (Alexander 2014). Dam-
ming rivers cause water levels to rise, drastically flooding forests and 
food and freshwater sources (Dudgeon 2000). Indigenous riverine 
and farming communities will inevitably be displaced. Besides eco-
nomic losses, these communities also lose their historical and cultural 
spaces and infrastructure (Alexander 2008). The environmental and 
cultural damage caused by dams can clearly be massive.  
A great part of policymakers’ attraction to hydropower can be at-
tributed to the marketing of “renewable” or “green” energy (Bird, 
Wüstenhagen, and Aabakken 2002). Clearly, in hydropower, no fuel is 
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combusted in electricity generation. In recent years, however, much 
environmental opposition has arisen to counter these “green” claims. 
Although no fossil fuel is burnt to generate electricity, it is possible 
for hydroelectric plants to produce higher levels of greenhouse gases 
than some fossil fuel–fired plants (Scherer and Pfister 2016; Fearn-
side 1997). Greenhouse gases in hydroelectric plants are produced by 
the anaerobic decomposition that happens underwater, especially in 
tropical areas where there are large areas of rainforests or other areas 
such as farmland that contain large amounts of plant biomass (Rosa 
et al. 2004; Fearnside 2002). This is evident at the Bakun Hydroelec-
tric Dam site, where the smell of hydrogen sulphide is strong when 
the dam starts releasing water from the reservoir, and residues from 
the spray cover lamp posts, vegetation, and other infrastructure 
around it. In contrast, in the rocky boreal parts of the world, emis-
sions from hydroelectric dams are typically equivalent to only a very 
small fraction of emissions from fossil fuel–fired power stations (Bar-
ros et al. 2011). 
In Sarawak’s case, hydropower is an integral part of the Sarawak 
Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE). Sarawak has traditionally 
been considered a poor state, although due to a large oil and gas in-
dustry it has the third-largest economy among all the Malaysian states 
(Jomo and Wee 2002: 10). The state accounts for about a quarter of 
Malaysia’s petroleum production, and nearly 60 per cent of the natu-
ral gas production of what is the world’s second-largest exporter of 
natural gas in the world (Office of the Chief Minister of Sarawak 
2015). The income from the high level of productivity, although gen-
erated in the state, goes instead to the federal government, with Sara-
wak receiving just 5 per cent of oil royalties (Puah, Lau, and Teo 
2012). SCORE is a supply-side prescription meant to boost heavy 
industry, the Gross State Product, and incomes by providing cheap, 
renewable energy (Lau 2015). This initiative is a federal government–
led project, and the first dam and the jewel in the crown is the Bakun 
Hydroelectric Dam, a 2400MW facility powered by a 204-metre-high 
reservoir that covers 700 square kilometres (an area approximately 
equivalent to that of Singapore, Dubai, or Brussels) (Oxford Business 
Group 2015; Sovacool and Bulan 2011a; Osman 2000). The process 
of executing the construction of the dam was fraught with examples 
of incompetence and reluctance. Forestry officials managed to 
wrongly gauge the height of the dam, and in doing so drowned al-
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most 30,000 rescued seedlings of ecologically and financially valuable 
tree species (Sarawak Hidro and Sarawak Forestry Corp 2013). The 
project was also initially handed to a business associate with political 
connections to the then prime minister of Malaysia under a newly 
established company called Ekran Berhad (Sovacool and Bulan 2013; 
Smith 2003). After the “completion” of the biomass removal stage, 
which disguised the collection and sales of the valuable timber from 
the catchment area, the company withdrew from the project. Biomass 
removal, however, still was not completed, and another company, the 
Warghana Consortium, headed by the area’s federal member of par-
liament at the time took over that section of the construction con-
tract (Velaairam 2013). 
Australian Domestic Politics Interferes with the Bakun 
Project
The fact that the Bakun hydroelectric project is an Australian-initiated 
project has often gone unmentioned, and as shown later in this paper, 
the reduction of Australian influence in favour of Chinese influence 
did not result in better ecological and socio-economic outcomes. 
Australian engineers in the 1960s identified potential dam sites, and 
Australian state-owned companies Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric 
Authority (now known as Snowy Hydro Ltd., jointly owned by the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the governments of New South 
Wales and Victoria) and Hydro Tasmania (owned by the Tasmanian 
government) were heavily involved in managing the stages of con-
struction, in conjunction with the earliest contract buyer of the elec-
tricity, Rio Tinto Alcan (RTA, an Australian–Canadian company) 
(Alexander 2014; Sarawak Energy 2010). RTA was to build an alu-
minium smelter in the nearest city, Bintulu, and in line with their 
corporate social responsibilities, assisted in the resettlement of the 
people, including the provision of a professional anthropologist to 
consult with the communities with regards to choosing resettlement 
longhouse locations, as well as in the design of the longhouses them-
selves. On top of that, RTA funded the Asap-Koyan Development 
Committee (AKDC), which operated as an indigenous-led NGO to 
help the displaced communities, as well as to maintain and promote 
their culture (Rio Tinto 2013). 
The Australian influence in this project was soon curtailed in this 
and future dam projects in Sarawak for a number of reasons. First, 
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the Australian dam companies were eventually confined to technical 
advisory roles, and finally gave up altogether under pressure from 
green and human rights groups over the inevitable relocation of the 
longhouse communities. Second, cost overruns caused the project to 
exceed its budget massively. The state government insisted on raising 
pre-agreed electricity prices, and Rio Tinto Alcan decided to pull out 
of Sarawak as well (Reuters 2012). The Chinese then wholly took over 
the project, with Sinohydro completing the Bakun Dam, Three Gorg-
es Corporation completing the Murum Dam, and Chinalco signing an 
agreement for an aluminium smelter (Herbertson 2012; Reuters 2011). 
The role of domestic politics in Australia as it relates to the his-
tory of the Bakun Dam should not be underestimated. Environmen-
tal politics and the green movement in Australia gained significant 
prominence in the post-war Australian political landscape in Tasma-
nia from the 1960s to the 1980s through the protests against the 
Franklin and Lake Pedder dams (Bennett 2008). Tasmania takes its 
place in power-generation history as one of the pioneer adopters of 
hydropower; it was used to light up the city of Launceston in 1895 – 
the first in the Southern Hemisphere (Pierce 2007). Hydropower has 
since assumed a position as the primary source of power in Tasmania. 
When the then Hydro-Electric Commission tried to expand hydro-
power technologies, a long period of protest ensued; while the at-
tempt to stop the three dams that were to form Lake Pedder failed, 
the Franklin Dam project was ultimately abandoned. The acrimony 
resulted in the downfall of Tasmania’s state premier (Thomson 1985), 
and culminated in a lawsuit between the state government and the 
newly elected Hawke administration that ruled in the favour of the 
latter (High Court of Australia 1983). The landmark Commonwealth v. 
Tasmania case in 1983 became a turning point in history, as it marked 
the end of hydropower construction in Australia. Green groups in 
Australia eventually came together to form the Australian Greens, led 
by Dr. Bob Brown, a physician turned politician who was at the fore-
front of the Tasmanian dam protests. 
The tensions between hydropower construction and the Austral-
ian Greens were revived by the revelation in Australian media that 
Hydro Tasmania was involved in the Bakun and Murum hydroelectric 
project, which involved the displacement of the Orang Ulu commu-
nities along the associated rivers as well as the submergence of vast 
areas of tropical rainforests. The educated members of these com-
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munities also organised a trip to the various capital cities of Australia 
to spread the message of their plight and to exert pressure on the 
Australian federal and Tasmanian state governments to bring Hydro 
Tasmania to task (Yoon 2012), effectively introducing a new set of 
Australian actors with opposing interests. Within the Australian polit-
ical scene, the Australian Greens had become a significant political 
force. The Gillard administration oversaw a hung parliament, where 
the Australian Labor Party could not secure a ruling majority. The 
Australian Greens became kingmakers and made deals with Labor to 
form a government. On the backs of these deals, new Green leader 
Christine Milne and Bob Brown supported the protesters:  
The people of Tasmania are with you and do not want to see Hydro 
Tasmania displace 20,000 people. That is a shocking thing that 
Hydro Tasmania would be taking people out of their villages and 
destroying their livelihoods. We’ll be working with you and with 
other Green parties around the world to do what we can to not 
only save only forests around the world and rivers but livelihoods 
of communities and local cultures and saying to Hydro Tasmania: 
“Get out of Sarawak now.” – Sen. Christine Milne, Australian 
Greens. (ENS 2012) 
Here in Tasmania, no more hydro dams are being built, because 
of community opposition. But we learn that people from Hydro 
Tasmania are in Sarawak helping develop massive and quite de-
structive dams. It is my responsibility, having fought against de-
structive dams in Tasmania, to see that people who are affected by 
these dams are not only being heard but their wishes met. That’s 
not happening at the moment. – Sen. Bob Brown, Australian 
Greens. (ENS 2012) 
Clearly from Brown’s “it is my responsibility” remark, he placed a 
major Australian political force against Australian involvement in a 
landmark Malaysian federal government project. Hydro Tasmania 
then had to front an enquiry before eventually announcing that they 
were pulling out of Sarawak, which achieved at least one of the objec-
tives of the Orang Ulu delegation to Australia (Bolger 2012). Coupled 
with the withdrawal of Rio Tinto Alcan shortly thereafter, two Aus-
tralian corporations with sizeable corporate social responsibility cap-
abilities and commitments had exited from what was still a compli-
cated social situation in Sarawak. The responsibility of finishing con-
struction on the hydropower plant was now in Chinese hands with 
Sinohydro. 
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Chinese (Non-)Interactions, Marginalised  
Actors, and Environmental Symptoms 
Informal interviews with the longhouse community members reveal a 
long history of Australian interactions. Australian researchers have 
long had a tradition of maintaining at least one anthropologist work-
ing in upriver areas, from the post-war period onwards. Therefore, it 
is of little surprise that some of the displaced locals thought the an-
thropologists working with them to rebuild their livelihoods in the 
early stages were university or museum anthropologists. Admittedly, 
there is sometimes a little confusion. Australian missionaries brought 
Christianity to Borneo and established the de facto state church 
(Sidang Injil Borneo, SIB) (Tan 2016). As such, a prevalent attitude 
towards Australians is that they represent benevolent foreign influ-
ences. A gap exists in the perception of Australians between the 
common folk and the community leaders of the delegation that ar-
rived in Australia to protest against Hydro Tasmania. Members of the 
displaced communities generally spoke positively of the Australian 
consultants, and there was a general feeling that these consultants 
were doing good things for them in a trying period of time. For the 
things that did go wrong, such as compensation cash and land issues, 
access to the lake, and so on, displaced communities blamed the fed-
eral and state governments instead, and not the foreign firms con-
structing the dam. However, Chinese involvement in the reconstruc-
tion process was conspicuous for its absence in these conversations.  
Conversations about the differences between Australian and 
Chinese involvement typically start with an acknowledgement of the 
Australian presence and consulting process. This often draws out 
other stories about their previous interactions, sometimes from dec-
ades ago, with missionaries or other anthropologists from Australian 
universities. A number also recalled the name of the Rio Tinto con-
sultant in charge of resettlement and reconstruction, as well as a 
community meeting hosted for high-level Rio Tinto executives in 
which promises were made regarding reconstruction for the benefit 
of displaced communities. When it came to talking about events after 
the departure of the Australians, there was little to say about the Chi-
nese, usually apart from the acknowledgement that they seemed to 
have become the ones in charge, although almost no one had ever 
run into any of the Chinese executives or workers apart from the 
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occasional passing by of Chinese trucks. Thoughtful, unsure, and 
even stunned silences from members of the community followed 
questions on whether they thought the Chinese should have taken 
over the reconstruction process the Australians had so abruptly left 
behind. Often, they eventually conceded that the Chinese probably 
could have resumed the Australian efforts around livelihood and 
community reconstruction. So successful were the Chinese in isolat-
ing themselves that they managed to make people forget that there 
were corporate social responsibilities that they should have fulfilled; 
in addition, in managing the former, they also deflected all the misgiv-
ings and anger away from themselves and onto the Sarawakian and 
Malaysian governments. It is also worth noting that the small indigen-
ous group that protested Australian involvement did not protest the 
Chinese involvement. The Australian departure from Sarawak created 
a corporate social responsibility void that Chinese interests had failed 
to fill. This has previously been described as a “de-coupling” by the 
Chinese from social protection measures (Cooke et al. 2017). 
The inadequacy in addressing livelihood reconstruction resulted 
in a number of social effects that in turn had knock-on effects on the 
environment. Effective resettlement-livelihood reconstruction requires 
finding solutions to a number of factors of impoverishment: land-
lessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, and healthless-
ness (Cernea 1997). These factors often need to all be addressed to-
gether, as the interconnectedness of these concepts means that the 
presence of one factor will bring about the others (Cernea 1998). For 
example, marginalisation in a new resettlement area could lead to 
joblessness and the crippling of one’s finances, which cause home-
lessness, landlessness, and healthlessness. In the case of the commu-
nities displaced by the Bakun hydropower project, the primary liveli-
hoods of the people were made up of shifting cultivation for rice and 
vegetables, fishing and hunting of mainly ungulates such as deer and 
bearded pigs for protein, and a small amount of cash cropping of 
rubber, cocoa, and pepper. This was accomplished over large areas of 
land, which allowed for long, sustainable fallow periods to address 
land fertility. The relocation uprooted the 15 communities from the 
Bakun catchment area of almost 15,000 square kilometres to a much 
smaller resettlement site of 4,000 hectares, with each apartment of 
every longhouse village limited to a plot of three hectares of land to 
cultivate (Sovacool and Cooper 2013). Complaints about the unculti-
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vability and inaccessibility of the new plots soon arose and became a 
problem for the local government and a stick for the opposition to 
beat the elected leaders with.  
Distance to traditional hunting and fishing grounds also became 
problematic quickly. The two rivers that run around the resettlement 
site, Sungai Asap and Sungai Koyan, became polluted with waste and 
effluents and, in any case, would never have been able to support the 
fishing requirements of 15 longhouses. This meant that native custom-
ary lands remained the only source of protein. Returning to these 
lands would pose serious problems, and has widened the inequality 
between the haves and have-nots. The fundamentals of the inequality 
rift lie in two areas – starting capital and assets, and geography. The 
topography of the Bakun area is extremely steep and mountainous. 
As a result, the inundation by the reservoir does not form a “classic-
al” round lake, but a relatively narrow, and extremely long one (Fig-
ure 1). The customary land for the longhouse nearest to the jetty is 
but a five-minute boat ride away (Uma Bawang Figure 2), but the 
customary land for the longhouse furthest away takes a whole day to 
reach (Uma Kulit Figure 2). Over the course of fieldwork for this 
project, the boat trip required 400 litres of fuel to get to the location 
of the displaced longhouse furthest away and back. For hunters from 
the latter, this entails the need to get bigger boats, more hunting dogs, 
more powerful outboard motors, and bigger and better insulators to 
keep the game and fish from spoiling, and to spend more time out. 
This requires significant outlay, which few could afford. It denies 
reasonable access to community resources, is a form of marginalisa-
tion, and causes the loss of livelihoods of these hunters and fisher-
men, with a knock-on effect of food insecurity to the wider commu-
nity. Adding to the uncertainty, it remains unclear if or when the 
reservoir will be turned into a national park, and access to hunting 
lands will be restricted. The communities have no control over the 
access to their ancestral territory, hunting grounds, and fisheries.  
Hunters and fishermen eventually reacted by working more in-
tensively in the areas closer to the dam, in the customary lands of 
other longhouses, in spite of the historical taboos and the conflicts 
that these could lead to. The effects on the biota were significant. A 
camera trap survey of medium to large mammals done for the project 
of which this paper is also a part shows that animal activities are ex-
clusively nocturnal in the site closest to the jetty, while diurnal activity 
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recovers with upstream distance (in prep). Islands also provide a level 
of isolation or entrapment for species, and on one of two islands 
surveyed, bearded pigs, the most popular game, were absent. Fisher-
ies have also started declining. The formation of the considerably still 
lake created islands of fast-flowing water, where streams and water-
falls meet the lake, and concentrated but easy-to-deplete populations 
of fish. According to local fishermen, the sizes of the staple catfish 
species have greatly decreased in the popular fishing areas near the 
jetty. One fisherman poisoned a whole tributary just to prevent others 
from profiting from his longhouse’s stream. A small number of people 
have tried to start aquaculture, but like hunting, only those who can 
afford the starting capital and have the political connections (basically 
the longhouse elites) can embark on this endeavour, and this turns 
fish from a public to a private resource. With the politicising of the 
land, access to resources and the ability to produce and gather re-
sources had also become commodified. 
Figure 1. Landsat 8 Image Mosaic of the Bakun Dam from 16 June 2016 
 
Source: Landsat 8, United States Geological Service Products. 
Note: The small water body on the right is the reservoir of the newer Murum Dam. 
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Figure 2. Map of the Belaga District and Locations of the Various Indigen-
ous Communities Prior to Impoundment of the Bakun Dam 
 
Source: Alexander 2008. 
Traditionally, hunting is one of the most important activities in Orang 
Ulu societies. It was an economic activity that many men engaged in, 
as it was easy to access hunting grounds. Gun licences were also is-
sued easily in the past (Morrison 1993). This generation of hunters 
and gun owners are now old, and the weapons are passed on to their 
sons, who almost never have new licences of their own. Contempor-
ary hunters are thus, strictly speaking, operating illegally. Due to the 
reduced number of hunters, as well as the possibility of earning more 
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cash, the remaining hunters also hunt and possess beyond the al-
lowed quota of five kilograms, as well as supply to unofficial retailers, 
and cater to the demand for bushmeat from city folk. Furthermore, 
the future of their physical access to the lake is unsure, as the authori-
ties have released a notice of consideration to turn Bakun into a na-
tional park, which would rule out any possibility of hunting in those 
areas. Faced with such levels of uncertainty, and occupying very weak 
legal and power positions, hunters respond by starting to hunt wher-
ever is easiest, in as large quantities as possible, as well as hunting 
high-value species, such as pangolins. The loss of traditional hunting 
lands directly contributes to the disempowerment of hunters and is 
beginning to erode their status in the community; this is a demo-
graphic whose future is so intimately intertwined with their habitats. 
To the resettled communities, the Chinese disappeared from 
Belaga just as suddenly as they appeared, as soon as the project was 
handed over. As far as the government is concerned, the compensa-
tion has been paid, and the people resettled in a place with schools, 
electricity, and running water. For the longhouse communities, 
though, their problems were just beginning. Electrical bills now had 
to be paid to the state utility company. Free hydroelectricity was ap-
parently promised at the beginning, but they were paying for power 
from diesel generators. Where they once had free-flowing streams, 
they now had to contend with an inadequate supply from a water-
treatment plant that frequently choked from sediment and sometimes 
distributed muddy water into the pipelines. Problems with water qual-
ity and quantity persisted well into 2015, when fieldwork ended. 
Many land plots were also uncultivable and inaccessible. These prob-
lems prompted one prominent, outspoken Dayak politician, who also 
holds a PhD in anthropology, to lament that the residents at the Ba-
kun resettlement scheme were treated like “nobody’s child” (Sibon 
2012).  
The Politics of SCORE’s Crown Jewel 
To understand the root and the source of this predicament, one must 
understand the perspectives and objectives of the respective govern-
ments and how these synergise. The rupture of the relationship be-
tween the Australian corporations and the Malaysians in the process 
of the construction of the Bakun Dam is a case in point. Australians – 
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in particular, a specific section of the Australian political elite – had 
strong views against dams and displacement, and similarly strong 
views of the sanctity of natural spaces, which the Malaysians do not 
hold. One can point a finger towards the Australian Greens for re-
moving well-resourced and professional CSR actors from the con-
struction process, resulting in the suboptimal outcomes for the envir-
onment and displaced communities.  
Malaysian Interests 
The Bakun Dam is now a part of a larger scheme to boost productivi-
ty and achieve greater industrialisation of an otherwise largely agrarian 
Sarawak (Cramb 2013, 2007). A secondary aim is to produce enough 
electricity to form a viable energy-export industry to the surrounding 
states and territories (Lau 2015; Sovacool and Bulan 2012). Energy 
exports has been a consistent theme throughout Malaysia’s develop-
ment, from the oil exports from Peninsular Malaysia, to the natural 
gas exports mainly from Sarawak, to the smaller, but still significant 
coal exports from Sabah (Malaysia Productivity Corporation 2014). 
Electricity can thus be argued to be an extension of the energy-export 
industry.  
The construction of hydropower plants also has a second eco-
nomic advantage in that although the initial capital outlay can be high, 
running costs for fuel are virtually eliminated. Sarawak is noted for 
the year-long consistency of its river flows, even in drier seasons. 
Indeed, the earliest surveys done in the 1960s under the auspices of 
the Colombo Plan by Australian engineers identified Sarawak as the 
best area in the region for hydropower, “and just Borneo […] mean-
ing it would be a huge waste not to tap into it” (Sovacool and Bulan 
2011a). Using this and other tax incentives, the Malaysians are trying 
to attract energy, capital, and labour-intensive industries to invest in 
the coastal development nodes (Sovacool and Bulan 2012). This is 
meant to help the economy move beyond a primary agricultural pro-
duction industry towards downstream, value-added manufacturing 
industries.  
The thinking behind the design of SCORE is almost purely from 
a state-level macroeconomic point of view. The information pages in 
the SCORE website cover a lot of information: from the planned 
power supplies, to the industries assigned to each development node, 
to the ethnic diversity of Sarawak. The promise of ready supplies of 
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affordable land, utilities, and university-trained graduates are promi-
nently displayed. Strikingly, the visuals are overwhelmingly skewed 
towards coastal and urban settings. What is not mentioned is that 40 
per cent of Sarawakians are rural, with many wanting to stay rural, 
and that the development of “ecotourism” is on the reservoir that 
flooded the forested landscapes in Sarawak’s interior. The term “hydro-
power” is mentioned only twice, and Bakun is not mentioned in any 
of the informational text. At the time of writing, a second hydro-
power station, Murum, is online and preparations are underway for 
the third dam, Baleh. The construction of Murum also involved dis-
placement of longhouse communities.  
Attitudes of the Sarawakian and Malaysian governments towards 
resources in the interior of Sarawak have always been exploitative and 
extractive. Sarawak is the largest state in Malaysia and was covered 
mostly by tropical rainforest. Among the endemic tree species are 
numerous valuable sorts of hardwood timber (Ekran Berhad 1994). 
Since the 1980s, Sarawak has been one of the global epicentres of 
deforestation (Gaveau et al. 2014). In 2010, the state accounted for 
0.5 per cent of the world’s rainforest by area, but 25 per cent of the 
global tropical log exports (International Tropical Timber Organisa-
tion 2010). A satellite imagery analysis in 2013 concluded that by 
then, only 5 per cent of Sarawak’s original forests remained (Global 
Witness 2013). The same attitudes can be seen with regard to Bakun; 
for instance, one interviewee commented that the construction of the 
dam turned “worthless water” into “valuable electricity” (Sovacool 
2011a). Government-level discourse has traditionally used “native” to 
refer to “backward rural Dayaks,” and development invariably would 
involve centralising their previously disparate living locations and 
changing traditional shifting cultivation to intensive, estate plantations 
(Cramb 2013). Hence, the construction of Bakun would accomplish 
multiple objectives, including energy production, timber harvesting 
(during the biomass removal stage), and the chance to centralise the 
longhouse communities for easier governance (Jehom 2008). 
Based on available evidence up to 2015, Cooke et al. (2017) con-
cluded that the arrangement of having Sarawak Hydro (the then fed-
eral government entity that operated the Bakun hydropower station) 
depend on the state-government energy agency Sarawak Energy to 
dictate production is an example of elite wealth capture, which the 
federal government viewed as its contribution to Sarawak’s develop-
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ment. However, in August 2017, the federal government sold the 
dam to Sarawak Energy (Povera 2017). This now leaves the Sarawak 
state government to wholly own the proceeds of power generation. 
Table 1. Timeline Showing the Attempts at Initiating the Bakun Dam 
Project, and that Peninsular Malaysia Was Meant to Be the  
Recipient of the Power from Bakun until Very Recently 
Date Event 
February 
1966 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-electric Authority of Australia com-
mences identifying hydropower sites in Sarawak (including  
Bakun) under the auspices of the Colombo Plan 
April 1977 Bakun HEP construction plans shelved over cost concerns 
March 1979 Deputy Prime Minister Tun Mahathir suggests a revival of the Bakun project (2nd time) 
May 1981 Federal government completes feasibility study that recommends Bakun HEP be built to supply electricity to Peninsular Malaysia 
January 1986
Mahathir, now prime minister, initiates the process of construct-
ing Bakun by officially allowing the start of biomass clearance 
from the catchment and reservoir zone 
April 1988 Federal government obtains USD 56 million World Bank loan approval for the Bakun HEP 
February 
1990 
Bakun HEP plans shelved again, due to recession and pressure 
from local communities 
December 
1992 
Prime Minister’s Department tries to initiate the Bakun project 
again (3rd time) 
December 
1997 
Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim 
suspends Bakun project again amid the Asian Financial Crisis 
September 
1998 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ibrahim dismissed 
June 1999 Mahathir again tries to revive the Bakun project (4th time) 
May 2000 
Bakun project is reduced from 2400MW with undersea transmis-
sion to Peninsular Malaysia, to 500MW without undersea trans-
mission 
August 2000 Mahathir restores original plans for the Bakun HEP (5th time) 
October 
2003 Mahathir retires as prime minister 
May 2010 Undersea cable plans finally dropped 
Source: Adapted from Sovacool and Bulan (2011a), with additional information from 
McDermott, Pura, and Wessel (1998), and Perlez (2003). 
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Historically, Bakun was not a project of the state government, and 
had been initiated (and then shelved) by Tun Mahathir Mohamed’s 
federal government with the main purpose of supplying electricity to 
Peninsular Malaysia by undersea cables across the South China Sea 
(Sovacool and Bulan 2011a; Table 1), and not to help develop Sara-
wak’s industries.  
Chinese Interests 
China’s “Going Out” strategy, first announced in 2001, was borne 
out of an observation that the heavily export-driven Chinese econo-
my was very exposed to financial crises elsewhere in the world 
(Yelery 2014). “Going Out” was seen as a way to diversify Chinese 
investments as well as to create new markets and demand for Chinese 
industrial output. As other researchers have pointed out, hydropower 
prominently features among the industries that have successfully 
embraced this set of policies. Others, such as journalist Jonathan 
Watts, noted speculatively the connections between the rise of global 
Chinese hydropower construction with the career histories of Presi-
dent Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao as, respectively, a hydro-
power engineer (including a period of time with Sinohydro) and a 
geologist (Watts 2010).  
One of the reasons often cited for aggressive hydropower export 
was the saturation within the Chinese domestic market (Bosshard 
2009). This saturation can be said to be the inadvertent result of Chi-
nese domestic social policy. As a result of the construction of the 
Three Gorges Dam, critics of large-scale hydropower construction 
now have a focal point for their attacks. Both President Hu and 
Premier Wen skipped the opening ceremony of the dam (Mithen 
2012). The latter also intervened in the construction plans of further 
hydropower dams in China, resulting in only a third of planned pro-
jects actually being allowed to commence (Stanway 2012). Clearly, 
this would have caused a situation where there was a glut of suppliers 
with only a third of forecasted projects to bid on. It would then be 
unsurprising that the hydropower industry would be among the most 
enthusiastic and aggressive adopters of the “Going Out” policy.  
Besides the need to maintain industrial capacity, Matthews and 
Motta (2015) also noted three other economic and political drivers of 
Chinese hydropower aid and investment overseas based on their 
work in the Greater Mekong Subregion: management of foreign ex-
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change reserve fluctuations, the packaging of aid and foreign direct 
investment together, and the building of geopolitical alliances and 
alignments. To protect the Chinese yuan (CNY) and shield China’s 
foreign exchange reserves from externalities, the Chinese move state 
funding out of the country via state-owned enterprises such as Sino-
hydro, in the form of foreign direct investment. In Bakun’s case, 
although Chinese enterprises were contractors there to complete a 
project initiated by others, China’s Exim Bank provided the financ-
ing. Therefore, the latter two drivers were definitely factors. Indeed, 
post-Bakun, from 2012 to 2015, Chinese investment into Malaysia 
jumped more than 10-fold (January 2017), and Sinohydro has been 
awarded various construction projects in Sarawak, from power sta-
tions to shopping malls. 
One defining aspect of Chinese infrastructural aid or construc-
tion is commonly described as “no strings attached” (Heng 2012; 
McDonald, Bosshard, and Brewer 2009; Yang 2009). The Chinese 
government and corporations heading out of China for projects pur-
sue a policy of “non-interference,” which essentially guarantees that 
the Chinese government will not intervene or participate in any do-
mestic or governance matters within host countries (Strauss 2009). 
This is diametrically opposed to common Western (World Bank or 
International Monetary Fund) aid, which often prescribes political 
conditions to be met (McElhinny and Heineken 2013). A second 
condition is that the Chinese government pursues a policy of mutual 
economic benefit, which began with Deng Xiaoping’s “win-win” 
foreign aid reform (Yelery 2014). Nevertheless, recipient govern-
ments have the negotiating room to “attach strings,” and some au-
thors have noted Chinese flexibility in this respect (Hensengerth 
2013; Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013). Ultimately, it can be argued that 
China’s foreign aid policy is an extension of its domestic policy. For 
example, it is common policy for Exim Bank projects to require that 
at least half of all required supplies come from Chinese enterprises 
(Mohan and Lampert 2013; House of Commons 2009). Chinese aid is 
also heavily skewed towards construction, with Chinese corporations 
assuming the responsibility of building infrastructure, providing a 
base from which other Chinese businesses can secure further benefit, 
and being a source of employment for Chinese citizens (Sun 2014; 
Corkin, Burke, and Davies 2008; Centre for Chinese Studies 2006). 
The stringent requirements for heavy dependence on Chinese equip-
  The Sarawakian Experience with Chinese Dam Building 141 

ment, engineering, and manpower also indicate an indifferent attitude 
to transferring knowledge and expertise to recipient countries (Nis-
sanke and Söderberg 2012). This is again very different from Western 
aid philosophy, which is more grounded in liberal-democratic ideolo-
gy, as opposed to China’s disinterest in democracy and interest in 
profit-seeking (Alden and Davies 2006). Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 
(2010) argue that China shifted from an ideological basis for foreign 
aid to an economic one. However, it may also be possible to think 
that the Chinese foreign aid philosophy is still ideologically grounded, 
in that the Chinese tendency towards pragmatism in foreign policy, 
and the belief that they are themselves an example of an economic 
success in the absence of transparency, liberal democracy, and yield-
ing to Western interference, is in itself an ideology. 
Malaysia’s eagerness to complete the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam, 
a project that had been deemed politically impossible and whose scale 
of financial requirements for building had been judged possibly the 
toughest construction undertaking in the country, makes it an ideal 
candidate for Chinese assistance. In addition, the Malaysians had 
done a social impact assessment, and two environmental impact as-
sessments, providing a level of paperwork foundation. The Chinese 
could then leave the issues identified in the assessments as domestic 
matters to the Malaysian and Sarawakian governments to address on 
their own terms. Chinese corporations then further benefitted from 
this experience by being awarded the contract to build a second dam 
upstream from Bakun, the Murum Dam. This clearly fits with the 
Chinese concept of “win-win” in the “Going Out” strategy. 
Political Conditions and CSR Obligations 
Why did the Chinese take such a dramatically different approach in 
comparison to the Australians? It is important to look at the Bakun 
resettlement situation through Chinese lenses, to see how the Chinese 
understand CSR obligations, and the political and historical condi-
tions that have framed this project in both Malaysia and China. 
There is been an increasing amount of literature looking at Chi-
nese CSR, the evolution of CSR as a Chinese concept and its philo-
sophical differences with Western CSR concepts, and other differ-
ences in terms of application and compliance. Tan-Mullins and 
Hoffman (2014) briefly reviewed the emergence of a Chinese CSR 
concept. Chinese CSR came about out of trade requirements. Target 
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markets of mass production in the earlier periods of Chinese eco-
nomic and industrial expansion became aware of suboptimal working 
conditions in Chinese factories. Pressures exerted on suppliers forced 
factories to begin to comply with a Western concept of optimal 
working conditions. Therefore, the first Chinese experience in CSR 
came in the form of their own workforce being recipients or benefi-
ciaries of Western CSR requirements; Chinese companies did not 
necessarily view their original work arrangements as improper, but 
they changed practices for competitive trade reasons. Further devel-
opments in CSR requirements and further uptake of CSR practices by 
Chinese corporations were driven by the central government, again 
keen that they not lose their competitive edge in an increasingly in-
formed global business and consumer environment. If these, the 
Western imposition and the central government push, are taken to-
gether, from the perspective of Chinese businesses CSR activities are 
necessarily driven by forces external to the core business itself, rather 
than representing a self-initiated reform of business practices. One 
could argue that this holds true even for state-owned enterprises.  
Another external motivation of CSR compliance within China is 
the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), especial-
ly environmental NGOs (ENGOs), which according the government 
essentially perform the role of environmental inspectors (Whitehead 
2014). Corporate engagement with NGOs is very much a Western 
concept. Hence, in large part Chinese corporations would not volun-
tarily initiate engagement with NGOs or ENGOs at development 
sites. In the case of large infrastructure projects, contact is only main-
tained with their clients. In the case of Bakun, this would be the Ma-
laysian and Sarawakian governments, and the relevant agencies, such 
as Sarawak Energy. Given the necessity of exogenous forces to moti-
vate CSR activities by Chinese corporations, it could follow that, at 
least during Bakun’s construction and in the immediate post-con-
struction period, there needed to be a political environment that 
would compel environmental mitigation and livelihood-reconstruc-
tion efforts on the part of Sinohydro, which appear to be absent in 
Sarawak.  
The history of the Bakun hydroelectric project was always one 
fraught with difficulties and government opaqueness. Construction of 
the dam had been announced, shelved, or modified multiple times 
(Sovacool and Bulan 2011a). At the local scale, longhouse communi-
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ties themselves had been told that they would have to move, then not 
to move. These conflicting announcements created an environment 
of much uncertainty. When the project did go ahead, disputes erupt-
ed over compensation, and the calculation of compensation, with 
both sides accusing each other of dishonesty. Communities say that 
they had to go through two valuations of their crops and land, the 
first being two years before relocation, and the second just before the 
relocation, and that they were never told to expect two separate valu-
ations. As they had expected to move, they had neglected their gar-
dens and fruit trees, resulting in significant devaluations in the second 
round. However, some longhouses embarked on large extension 
projects, creating new blocks and apartments in the hopes of being 
able to claim larger compensation amounts. The process of prescrib-
ing compensation to stock assets and turning them to cash essentially 
commodifies their ancestral lands and weakens the bond between the 
communities and their ancestral lands (Cooke et al. 2017). 
The governments of Malaysia and Sarawak were also opaque 
about the process of the dam building: from financial costs, to the 
awarding of contracts to environmental impacts, to the relocation of 
communities. There are two environmental impact assessment re-
ports, commissioned respectively in 1994 and 2008, and one social 
impact assessment (Rousseau 1994), which are not easily available to 
the public. Perhaps due to the pressure the government and Sarawak 
Energy were under, getting interviews during the fieldwork period 
(2014–2015) from staff in the relevant departments was quite diffi-
cult. However, much important information can still be gleaned from 
an earlier set of interviews (Sovacool and Bulan 2011b). In particular, 
one of the informants pointed out that the results of the contract-
awarding process appear to be dubious. Ekran Berhad was the first 
company awarded the contract to build the dam, even though it really 
only had expertise in logging. The company eventually did leave after 
it was deemed to have fulfilled the biomass (logging) phase of the 
project. Another company, Sime Darby, better known for its oil-palm 
plantation business, was awarded the contract for civil works, even 
though, in the informant’s words, it “had never done anything re-
motely like a dam before.” This effectively meant that Sime Darby’s 
joint venture partner, Sinohydro, had practical control over the con-
tract. Indeed, one of the reasons that Malaysia ended up having to 
pay for the whole project was because the processes involved in re-
  144 Shun Deng Fam 

settlement and assessing environmental impacts were not up to inter-
national standards as required by the World Bank and Asian Devel-
opment Bank. Clearly, the construction was going ahead without 
internationally accepted environmental and social safeguards. 
A common complaint in countries where Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are developing is that they provide little local em-
ployment, with substantial literature from Africa written about the 
Chinese enclaves that have sprouted from imported Chinese labour 
instead of the construction project creating jobs for the local work-
force, and the politicised tensions between migrant and host popula-
tions (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009; Park 2009; Alden and Davies 
2006). In this respect, the Bakun project is not dissimilar. Local la-
bour was not employed, with foreign low-skilled workers from China, 
as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, being brought in. Certainly, 
cost was a factor. It is claimed that the foreign workers were paid less 
than half of what a local would expect. However, Sinohydro’s promi-
nent involvement in the Bakun project with financing support by 
China Exim Bank meant that there was likely to be a significant Chi-
nese migrant labour force. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper has contributed to the discussion of the CSR behaviour of 
Chinese enterprises in developing nations. A political ecology ap-
proach was used in order to examine the historical, political, and 
power conditions that resulted in the project being shifted from Aus-
tralian foreign aid to Chinese investment, as well as to look at the 
effects that the upheaval and differing Chinese attitudes have caused 
from national to community scales.  
On an international scale, the paper finds that while far from 
perfect, the Australian presence ensured a degree of investment in the 
sustainability of long-term safeguards in the displaced communities, 
such as the establishment of the AKDC development fund to main-
tain cultural vibrancy and assist in livelihood re-establishment, and 
the active consultation in the design and location of the longhouses in 
the resettlement site. This stands in contrast to the Chinese approach, 
which aimed to deliver a specific infrastructural project, while the 
Malaysian federal and state governments were wholly responsible for 
the environmental and social safeguards of the reservoir and the re-
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settlement site. Enterprises on both sides are subject to their own 
countries’ domestic politics and societal norms. In Australia’s in-
stance, the extremely strong disapproval of hydropower projects 
from their own domestic hydropower experiences forced the with-
drawal of Australian interests in Bakun. The Chinese were influenced 
by the “Going Out” policy, which encouraged SOEs to develop 
overseas and bring with them manpower and procurement contracts. 
On a national level, the Bakun project has been repeatedly start-
ed, restarted, and shelved by the federal government. In the almost 50 
years of history of the dam as a concept, the project was firmly a 
federal one, with Peninsular Malaysia – rather than Sarawak and its 
displaced and dispossessed indigenous communities – as the primary 
beneficiary of the cheaper electricity. The project was meant to indi-
cate Malaysia’s economic and industrial progress. It was much later 
on that the concept of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy 
was implemented, with industries based in Sarawak, without having 
to send power to Peninsular Malaysia. Malaysia’s dependence on 
foreign aid and technical expertise to complete the project also meant 
that the Chinese were in a position of power following the Australian 
withdrawal. 
For Sarawak’s native communities, their history and culture are 
tied intimately to rivers and the lands around them. Hydropower has 
its merits as a way to generate power, but it is extremely disruptive 
and destructive to these riparian cultures. Their experience with the 
process of the construction of the Bakun hydroelectric project has 
been one of uncertainty from the decades of false starts by the coun-
try’s leaders, and unhappiness with their federal and state representa-
tives over the mishandling of their resettlement. Post-resettlement, 
communities experienced a widening of entrenched inequalities, part-
ly due to geography, partly due to the fact that they do not retain 
certain and secure access to their traditional livelihood resources, and 
partly due to some families not having the same access to capital as 
other, aristocratic families. This has led to further destructive exploi-
tation of the ancestral lands by the communities themselves, through 
overfishing and overhunting. The most striking aspect of the Chinese 
involvement in Bakun is that while many other projects elsewhere in 
the world included direct communication between communities and 
the SOEs, there seemed to be an insularity of the Chinese vis-à-vis 
the local communities. This is clearly seen through the resistance 
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movements from the displaced communities, which protested Austral-
ia’s involvement at Bakun, but did nothing about the Chinese pres-
ence. Locals from various levels, from the common person to the 
aristocratic class, seemed surprised when asked about the lack of Chi-
nese involvement in safeguards after the withdrawal of the Australians. 
In 2016, Sinohydro established a permanent office in Kuala 
Lumpur, the financial capital of Malaysia (Edward 2016). This signals 
a very real possibility of further dams being built in Malaysia and 
Indochina, on top of their existing commitments. However, there 
may be reason to be optimistic. In the pragmatic way that Chinese 
factories reacted to demand for better working conditions, Chinese 
corporations, especially the larger state-owned enterprises such as 
Sinohydro, and the Chinese government are also reacting to the glob-
al scrutiny of Chinese hydropower exports (Bosshard 2010). Sino-
hydro briefly had a comprehensive environmental policy agreement, 
which included clauses on environmental protection, community 
consultation, and restoration of community livelihoods and income 
(International Rivers 2012). This agreement, though, was quickly 
watered down after the company restructured, reducing engagement 
in social and environmental protection to a promise to “respond to 
grievances” (Nordensvard, Urban, and Mang 2015), possibly because 
the 2011 policy framework based on a World Bank template conflict-
ed with the national policy of non-interference. It may also be worth 
noting that Chinese overseas aid and investment towards resources 
and energy infrastructure may begin to decline, as the Chinese econ-
omy evolves such that consumption and services, inherently com-
modity non-intensive industries, become more prominent. This 
movement would reduce the requirement for resources, and China 
could conceivably begin to exert more stringent governance require-
ments to recipient nations (Dollar 2016). 
There are signs from other dam projects that Chinese SOEs may 
be learning from experience. Sinohydro’s tribulations with staffing 
and manpower during the Bui Dam project in Ghana showed that 
they do not necessarily have to have a Chinese-majority workforce 
(Kirchherr, Disselhoff, and Charles 2016). Chinese SOEs also in-
creasingly appear to be willing to invest in safeguards in dam projects, 
even if their host countries do not demand this of them. For ex-
ample, resettlement compensation was paid during the Myitsone 
Dam project in Myanmar, even though this was not legally required 
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(Kirchherr, Disselhoff, and Charles 2016). The Myitsone Dam pro-
ject in particular is seen as influential in getting Chinese SOEs to raise 
their social safeguard standards, as the suspension of the project 
proved costly (Kirchherr 2017). Chinese development banks are also 
requiring SOEs to adopt stricter social safeguards, with China Exim 
Bank once even suspending funding for a dam in Gabon when envir-
onmental safeguard lapses were reported (Bosshard 2010).  
However, it takes two hands to clap. Instead of pushing all the re-
sponsibility onto Chinese enterprises, host governments also need 
ensure Chinese enterprises stick to their commitments. With the in-
creasing commercialisation of the operations of SOEs, they are now 
motivated to bid for and win dam projects for their own profit mar-
gins, without the political backing of the central government in China 
(Kirchherr 2017). This has been observed mainly in Africa (Kirchherr, 
Disselhoff, and Charles 2016; Tan-Mullins and Mohan 2013), but can 
occur anywhere that is too far for the electricity to be sent back to 
China, such as in the case of Bakun. Earlier work with Chinese SOEs 
has shown that under such pressures, expediency to complete projects 
means that they may still skip safeguard consultations, as long as there 
is little risk of the project being shut down or suspended (Kirchherr, 
Disselhoff, and Charles 2017). However, Chinese SOEs are also 
known to comply with safeguard practices in host countries with 
stricter legislation, and there is an increasing awareness of the need to 
maintain their reputations (Kirchherr, Disselhoff, and Charles 2016). 
Therefore, Chinese SOEs and the host countries need to work togeth-
er to ensure social and environmental safeguards are in place at high 
standards. In the case of Bakun, there is a distinct lack of clarity and 
continuity on this front, with the withdrawal of the Australian enter-
prises. Host governments also need to reassess their energy-mix re-
quirements and consider other forms of renewable energy. In the case 
of Sarawak, solar and wind have been shown to be viable energy alter-
natives, especially as those technologies have become more advanced 
and readily available (Shirley and Kammen 2015). In other places, 
hydropower may still have roles to play in responsible renewable-
energy mixes (Tan-Mullins, Urban, and Mang 2017). Western gov-
ernments may also need to reconsider their hardline tendencies on 
projects that involve displacement, as the Bakun Dam experience 
shows that a forced withdrawal in some cases may lead to even more 
suboptimal outcomes for the projects that they leave behind.  
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